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Biggs: ERISA Preempts All Texas Causes of Action That Relate to an Emplo

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

INSURANCE---ERISA-ERISA PREEMPTS ALL TEXAS CAUSES OF AcTION THAT RELATE TO AN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN INCLUDING THE
INSURANCE CODE, THE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND COM-

LAW. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life In
(Jan. 30, 1991).
MON

Co., 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 309

In the mid-1970's, Bette Cathey was diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. Cathey's physicians recommended home nursing care due to her worsening condition. At the time, Cathey assumed that the cost of her medical
care would be covered by her husband's insurance plan. This plan, the
"Dow" plan, was a group insurance plan her husband had acquired through
his employer, Dow Chemical.
Until 1985, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("Met") paid for Mrs.
Cathey's nursing expenses pursuant to its role as the claims administrator.
In 1985, however, Met informed the Catheys that payment for the home
nursing care would be discontinued because no medical necessity existed.
In response, the Catheys filed suit against Met alleging multiple common
law and statutory causes of action including: (1) breach of contract under
the Texas Insurance Code article 3.62; (2) unfair insurance practices under
the Texas Insurance Code article 21.21; (3) deceptive trade practices, unfair
insurance practices, and unconscionable conduct in violation of sections
17.46 and 17.50 of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (4) breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and gross negligence.
The Catheys did not assert any federal causes of action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").
The trial court found each cause of action preempted by ERISA and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, holding that all of the Cathey's
causes of action were preempted by ERISA. The Texas Supreme Court, in
turn, affirmed the appeals court decision and ruled that ERISA preempted
all of the Cathey's state law causes of action.
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to improve employee benefit and pension
1147
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plans. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see also H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. _, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG.

& ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4639. ERISA accomplished this goal by re-

quiring plan administrators to follow extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibilities in regard to both pension and welfare plans.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 10211031, 1101-1114 (1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1021-1031, 11011114 (1988)). ERISA does not, however, mandate that employers provide
benefits or determine what types of benefits an employer must provide.
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91. ERISA was also intended to provide employees with
benefit and pension plan protection that state laws had formerly been unable
to achieve. See Note, Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of State
Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV. 607-08 (1989). Thus, Congress
included a broad preemption provision that would result in ERISA preempting any state law that "related to" an employee benefit plan. See Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1974) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988)); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U. S. 41, 45-47 (1987) (defining broad nature of ERISA preemption
provision). In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court defined "relate to" to mean "a connection with or reference to such a
plan." 463 U.S. at 96-97. Congress originally attempted to mitigate the effect of the "preemption" clause by creating three statutory exceptions to
preemption in what is commonly known as the "savings clause." See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1988)); see also Chittenden, ERISA Preemption: The Demise of Bad Faith Actions in Group Insurance Cases, 12 S.ILL. U.L.J. 517, 519 (1988). These exceptions save from
preemption any state law which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). However, the "savings clause" is modified by the
"deemer clause" which states that no employee benefit plan shall be
"deemed" to be an insurance company in order to fall within "savings
clause" protection. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
Although an employer may provide a combination of pension, health, and
life insurance benefits, it is generally recognized that providing "medical,
surgical, hospital, death or disability" benefits will bring the plan within the
ERISA requirements. See Bishop & Denney, Hello ERISA, Good-Bye Bad
Faith: Federal Preemption of DTPA, Insurance Code, and Common Law
Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 270 (1989); see also Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(A) (1988).
Once the plan is considered an "ERISA" plan, any state law which "relates
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to" the plan will be preempted unless it falls within the "savings clause."
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-33 (1985).
One of the most confusing conflicts between the preemption and savings
clauses arises when an employee, subject to an ERISA plan, attempts to sue
his benefit plan insurer pursuant to a state statutory or common law cause of
action. See Comment, ERISA Preemption of California Tort and Bad Faith
Law: What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 519, 533 (1988) (noting unclear nature of ERISA preemption). The United States Supreme Court was faced
with such a conflict in Pilot Life, and held that state law claims for common
law breach of contract and tort, brought by employees against their benefit
plan insurers, were preempted by ERISA. 481 U.S. at 47-51. The Court
reasoned that to fall within the savings clause of ERISA, a state law must
satisfy a three prong test that shows: (1) the law in question has the effect of
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) the law is "an integral part of the policy
relationship;" and (3) the law "is limited to entities within the insurance
industry." Id. at 48-52; see also McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1988) (Act defines "business of insurance" in original federal
grant of state's regulatory powers). Applying this test, the Pilot Life Court
determined that the state causes of action in question were of general application, not specifically designed to regulate insurance, and were thus preempted by ERISA. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50.
Following Pilot Life, courts have consistently held that state laws which
were not specifically designed to regulate insurance would be preempted by
ERISA when applied to benefit plan insurers. See, e.g., Iron Workers MidSouth Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548, 553 (5th Cir. 1990);
Ramirez v. Inter-ContinentalHotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762-63 (5th Cir. 1989);
Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich, 871 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (5th Cir. 1989). A sampling
of state common law claims that cannot be brought against an ERISA plan
insurer includes: (1) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) breach of contract; (3) outrage and fraudulent denial of coverage; (4)
bad faith; and (5) negligence. See Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-63 (negligence
preempted); Cantrell v. Great Republic Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 1249, 1252-54 (9th
Cir. 1989) (good faith and fair dealing preempted); Settles v. Golden Rule
Ins. Co., 715 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Kan. 1989) (outrage and fraudulent
denial of coverage preempted); Tomcyzk v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United,
715 F. Supp. 914, 917 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (bad faith preempted); Shaw v. InternationalAss'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 563 F. Supp. 653, 65859 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (breach of contract
preempted). In addition, a number of state statutes have been preempted,
including a wide range of categories such as: (1) state criminal laws specifically directed at benefit plans; (2) state health insurance acts; and (3) state
securities regulations. See St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v.
Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D. Minn. 1980) (health insurance act pre-
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empted); Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing,Heating & PipingIndus., 424 F. Supp. 80, 82 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (state securities laws prempted);
Commonwealth v. Federico, 419 N.E.2d 1374, 1377-78 (Mass. 1981) (criminal laws preempted). Aside from these barriers to state law causes of action,
it is possible under the Pilot Life standard for a state statute to "regulate
insurance" within the meaning of the "savings clause." See, e.g., Northern
Group Servs., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 95 (6th Cir. 1987)
(statute requiring ERISA coordination with no-fault auto insurers not preempted); United Food & Commercial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157,
1161 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing coordination of benefits statute); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 635,
637 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (allowing coordination of no-fault insurance with
other policies). For instance, in Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Bell, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a Kansas statute that required
insurers to include certain minimum coverages in their policies. 798 F.2d
1331, 1334-36 (10th Cir. 1986). The court applied the three prong test set
out in PilotLife and found that all three elements were satisfied. Id. at 133435. Thus, the statute was saved from preemption. Id. at 1336.
Similar to other jurisdictions, Texas has a number of common law and
statutory causes of action that may be brought against an insurer for his
wrongful conduct. Among the most prevalent are actions for: (1) delay in
payment of losses; (2) unfair competition and practices; (3) deceptive trade
practices; and (4) numerous common law claims including misrepresentation, breach of contract, fraud, and bad faith. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
arts. 3.62, 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991); Bishop & Denney, Hello ERISA, Good-Bye Bad Faith: Federal Preemption of DTPA, Insurance Code,
and Common Law Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 272-73
(1989). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered some of these
causes of action when asserted against benefit plan insurers, and has often
held that such actions are preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., Ramirez, 890
F.2d at 762-64; Boren v. N.L. Indus., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 3283, 111 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1990); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d
1456, 1465 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987). In the recent
case of Ramirez v. Inter-ContinentalHotels, an employee covered by a group
medical plan sued his employer and benefit plan insurer alleging breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and violations of the Texas
Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). 890 F.2d
at 762. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the common law and
statutory DTPA causes of action and held that the claims were preempted.
Id. at 763-64. Further, the court applied the Pilot Life three prong test and
determined that article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, regulating unfair
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competition and practices, was not a law that regulated insurance within the
savings clause definition and was also preempted. Id.
Texas state courts have also been faced with similar claims made by insureds against their benefit plan insurers, and have quickly preempted those
same statutory and common law causes of action alleged in Ramirez. See,
e.g., Silva v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 13-90-147-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Jan. 24,1991, n.w.h.)(WL 5088); Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
764 S.W.2d 286, 290-91 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988), aff'd, 34
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 309 (Jan. 30, 1991); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 752
S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ granted); ESystems, Inc., v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 956, 958-60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
writ denied); Sams v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 735 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); Giles v. TI Employees Pension Plan, 715
S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, - U.S. -,
,.,111 S. Ct. 403, 486, - L. Ed. 2d ___, - (1990). Generally, the common
law causes of action were the easiest to preempt because they related to a
benefit plan, but were clearly not specifically designed to regulate insurance.
See Cathey, 764 S.W.2d at 290. In contrast, Texas employees held out, hoping that Texas' state courts would find that articles 3.62 and 21.21 of the
Texas Insurance Code were laws that were specifically designed to regulate
insurance within the savings clause. See Silva, No. 13-90-147-CV (WL
5088) (employee's sole state law cause of action article 21.21 Insurance
Code). In fact, the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District in
Cathey v. Metropolitan Life noted that the Texas legislature's express purpose in enacting article 21.21 was to regulate trade practices in the business
of insurance. 764 S.W.2d at 291. Following this intent, the court concluded
that article 21.21 did fit the Pilot Life three prong test to qualify a state law
for the savings clause. Id. However, the court ruled that the deemer clause
prevented any state regulation of an insurance company's conduct concerning a benefit plan or its participants. Id.
With the declaration in Cathey that article 21.21 fell within the savings
clause, other inroads into ERISA began to emerge. In Hermann Hosp. v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District held that a hospital which had been assigned a patient's benefit plan
proceeds could sue the benefit plan insurer for negligent misrepresentation
and unfair and deceptive trade practices under article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code. 803 S.W.2d 351, - (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, n.w.h.); see also Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904
F.2d 236, 245-50 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing article 21.21 claim, negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel). The court, relying on a Fifth Circuit
case, Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. NorthbrookLife Ins. Co., reasoned that the hospital's claims were not preempted because the "gravamen" of the hospital's
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claim was not based upon the policy proceeds, but upon an "independent"
misrepresentation by the insurance company. Hermann Hosp., 803 S.W.2d
at _.

The Texas Supreme Court also seemed to be divided over the extent of the
ERISA preemption. In McClendon v. Ingersoll-RandCo., the court, in a 5-4
decision, held that an employer who had fired an employee to avoid paying
retirement benefits could still be sued for wrongful discharge despite ERISA's preemption provision. 779 S.W.2d 69, 71-73 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 403, - L. Ed. 2d - (1990). Thus, with the lower court
in Cathey declaring that article 21.21 falls within the savings clause and preemption exceptions being recognized for benefit plan assignees such as hospitals, it appeared possible that the Texas Supreme Court's division would at
least preserve article 21.21 as a weapon for employees against their benefit
plan insurers. However, on December 3, 1990, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon. See - U.S. ., __, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483, - L. Ed. 2d -, (1990). The Court noted that the Texas wrongful discharge action in question specifically mentioned benefit plans which in turn gave the Court no
difficulty in concluding that the cause of action "relates to" a benefit plan.
U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 483, - L. Ed. 2d at _. See generally TEX.
Gov'T CODE ANN. Title 8 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (statutes evidence strong
interest in pension and benefit plans). In addition, the Court held that the
employee's claims were preempted even though he was not suing for the
benefit plan proceeds, but for future lost wages. IngersollRand Co., - U.S.
at-, 111 S.Ct. at 481,- L. Ed. 2d at-.
Following what may be described as a cue from the United States
Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court in Cathey finally ruled that causes
of action based in state law, brought by an employee against his benefit plan
insurer, are preempted by ERISA. The court first recited the relevant portion of the ERISA preemption provisions that had given ERISA such far
reaching authority. In addition, the Court referred to the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Pilot Life, Shaw, and most recently IngersollRand Co. which have given ERISA's preemption provision a loosely defined
and broad interpretation. Finally, the court recited the Fifth Circuit's decisions and other Texas decisions that have followed the United States
Supreme Court's lead in preempting Texas' common law and statutory
causes of action. From this broad base of judicial authority, the Court concluded that the Cathey's state law claims were "related to" a benefit plan
and were thus preempted by ERISA.
The anticipation that the Texas Supreme Court would rule that article
21.21 was within the savings clause was quickly dispelled when the court
ruled that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Pilot Life and Ingersoll-Rand Co. evidenced strong congressional intent that all causes of action
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for improper claims processing be preempted by ERISA. Unfortunately, the
court saw it as unnecessary to analyze the Texas Insurance Code's provisions according to the three prong "savings clause" test developed in Pilot
Life.
Justice Doggett, in his concurring opinion, noted the failure of the Texas
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court to fully recognize the savings clause and the deference Congress had intended for state insurance regulation when it passed the McCarren-Ferguson Act. Justice Doggett
illuminated the fact that as a result, employees who obtained health care
insurance from their employers would be left without a wide array of state
law claims that an individual purchaser of the exact same policy would have
at his disposal.
It is clear from the volume of precedent in federal and state courts that the
decision in Cathey is somewhat predictable. In one decision, the Texas
Supreme Court took away the right of a Texas worker to sue his benefit plan
insurer. This decision may only have done what the United States Supreme
Court in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon indicated that it might eventually
do if presented with a similar case. However, it is disappointing that the
Texas Supreme Court did not go into greater analysis of the Texas Insurance
Code's article 21.21 and its relation to ERISA's savings clause. The Texas
Supreme Court did, fortunately, restrict its decision to the facts presented in
Cathey, leaving intact for appeal situations similar to those in Hermann
Hosp. where an assignee of an employee's benefit plan proceeds sues an insurance company, not for the proceeds of the policy, but for its independent
wrongful conduct.
Brent Biggs
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